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I have a hard exam tomorrow and this home work due tomorrow too !I do no have an

ID: 1232445 • Letter: I

Question

I have a hard exam tomorrow and this home work due tomorrow too !I do no have any time to do that!Please help me!
Suppose that two players, Row and Column, play the following matrix game.
Column
                 L       C       R
          T (5, 5) (0, 6)  (0, 0)
          M (6, 0) (2, 2)  (0, 0)
ROW   B (0, 0) (0, 0)  (0, 0)

Part a. Find all of the game's pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

Now suppose that the players play this game twice in a row. They observe what each other did in the first stage before they decide what to do in the second stage. Each player's payoff is the (undiscounted) sum of his payoffs in the first and second stages.

Part b. Illustrate the game tree for the two-stage game making sure to represent the players' decisions and payoffs.

Explanation / Answer

Best responses will be bolded sence the highlight tool was removed from cramster and the drawing tool was removed so I cannot draw the tree form.


Your nash equilibrium is

LC R
T (5, 5) (0, 6) (0, 0)
M (6, 0) (2, 2) (0, 0)
ROW B (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)


Therefore there are two nash equilibria

(M,C),(B,R)