I have a hard exam tomorrow and this home work due tomorrow too !I do no have an

Question

I have a hard exam tomorrow and this home work due tomorrow too !I do no have any time to do that! if any one have chase online account and answer the question . I promise I will pay 10 bucks to your account!!!

Suppose that two players, Row and Column, play the following matrix game.
Column
                    L       C        R
          T    (5, 5)   (0, 6) (0, 0)
          M (6, 0)   (2, 2) (0, 0)
ROW B    (0, 0)   (0, 0) (0, 0)

Part a. Find all of the game's pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

Now suppose that the players play this game twice in a row. They observe what each other did in the first stage before they decide what to do in the second stage. Each player's payoff is the (undiscounted) sum of his payoffs in the first and second stages.

Part b. Illustrate the game tree for the two-stage game making sure to represent the players' decisions and payoffs.

Part c. Find a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the players' decisions in the second stage do not depend on their decisions in the first stage. Be sure to specify players' strategies clearly, remembering that a strategy must be a complete contingent plan for playing the game.

Are there any such equilibria in which players do anything other than play one of the equilibria you identified in (a) in each stage? Explain.

Part d. Now find a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the players play (T, L) in the first stage, and therefore do better than by repeating the best symmetric Nash equilibrium in the one-stage version of the game. Explain the intuition that supports this equilibrium.

Part e. Would your answers to part (d) change if the players could not observe what each other did in the first stage before they decide what to do in the second stage? Explain why or why not.

Part f . Why is it possible to support a desirable but non-equilibrium outcome like (T, L) in the first stage of this two-stage game as part of a subgameperfect equilibrium, but not the desirable but non-equilibrium outcome (Cooperate, Cooperate) in the first stage of a two-stage Prisoners’ Dilemma? Why might it be possible to support cooperation in an infinitely-repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma? Explain briefly.

Explanation / Answer

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nash_equilibrium a.using the concept mentioned in wiki the nash equilibria is 2,2 b. now since after 1st step both know that they have choosen (2,2). so inorder to maximize their profits they would choose (6,0) and (0,6) respectively. thinking another step again to max profit they would reach the equilibium at (5,5) c. co ordination game strategy d.yes there is a game called co ordination game in which both co ordinate to get the best result. see the wiki link for clear explanation e. no it would not change because in a co ordination strategy both players trust each other to get maximum result. f.it will not work for prisoners dilema because by not co operating the prisoner has a chance to get more benefit than co operating. In this case best result for both is when both co operate. when the process is repeated infinite number of times both have the information about their previous moves. so if they both co operate in 1st step then there is a probability that both may trust each other and continue to co operate http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner's_dilemma i tried my best. if u find it useful please award me more than pts somehow if u can..i do not have a chase acoount

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