1. \"34\" and RAD are Maymester 13 fashionistas, and want to wear their tank top
ID: 1216331 • Letter: 1
Question
1. "34" and RAD are Maymester 13 fashionistas, and want to wear their tank tops to class. But being the only one wearing a tank top makes them uncomfortable. Their strategies are thus (tt, s), mnemonic for "tank top and "sleeves and their payoffs are tt (3,3 (1.2) Determine the s (2,1) (2,2 Nash equilibria (if any) for this game. Your answer should have the form: "The Nash equilibria (equilibrium) is the pair (a, b), (or, "there is no Nash equilibria in pure strategies." Explain your reasoning. 2. Lauren and Julia, two other Maymester 13 fashionistas, like to wear their favorite tank tops which are identical- on co-curricular activities But they really hate it when they both are wearing the same top. Their strategies are thus (tt, s), mnemonic for "tank top" and "sleeves," and Itt (1,10 (3,2) Determine the their payoffs are s (2,3) (2,2) Nash equilibria (if any) for this game, and explain your reasoning. 3. "34" and RAD are "team followback" members of twitter, and can com- municate before class So are Lauren and Julia Does this suggest anything about the Nash equilibria (if there are any) of the games in (1) and (2)? A. The games in question (1) and (2) are famous in game theory and have applications to conflict economics Give at least one analogy between each of these games and a relevant scenario from conflict economics.Explanation / Answer
1.In that case both (3,3) and (2,2) are nash equilibrium -as supppose player 1 chooses tt then player 2 also gets 3 by choosing tt also.When player 1 chooses s player 2 also gets 2 by choosing s.So the two strategies tt and s for player 1 and tt and s for player B are pure strategy.Strategy pair (3,3) and (2,2) are called "pure strategy equilibria".There is no dominant strategy.
2.In that case both (1,1) and (2,2) are nash equilibrium -as supppose player 1 chooses tt then player 2 also gets 3 by choosing tt also.When player 1 chooses s player 2 also gets 2 by choosing s.So the two strategies tt and s for player 1 and tt and s for player B are pure strategy.Strategy pair (1,1) and (2,2) are called "pure strategy equilibria".There is no dominant strategy.
3.If both can communicate before movement then we can say that may be one player moves first which is known to other one or they can talk with each other before the movement.So communication helps to move first,communicate first and promise by one or both players.
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