Question
hi can i get help with this game theory problem? thanks
c) vote for d
There are three voters (Left, Center and Right) who needs to choose one of the three candidates (C, A and G) as the leader of their team. The preferences of the three vote common knowledge and are as following: 4. LEFT CENTER RIGHT DGA (a). Show that there will never be a winner if these three voters use the Borda rule voting. (5 points) (b). Suppose the three voters decide to use the two-stage binary voting rule: vote two candidates in the first stage using majority rule; the winner from the first stagei against the third candidate in majority voting. If voter Center has the chance to deci two candidates are picked in the first stage, which two should the Center voter cho believes there will be no strategic voting? And why? (5 points). (c). Now suppose the three voters are using the two-stage binary voting rule ar lready determined that candidate A will be against D in the first stage. Show that oter's strategy in the first stage in the subgame perfect equilibrium is to vote for
Explanation / Answer
C The vote for D that tell that G will be the losser
and the equation is as:
C >A > D.
