The Superconducting Supercollider BOOK PROJECT MANAGMENT FORUTH EDITION!!!!!!!!!

Question

The Superconducting Supercollider BOOK PROJECT MANAGMENT FORUTH EDITION!!!!!!!!!!! APA FORMAT!!!!!!!!PLEASE

Conceived in the 1980s as a device to accelerate particles in high-energy physics research, the Superconducting Supercollider (SSC) was a political and technical hot ­potato from the beginning. The technical challenges associated with the SSC were daunting. Its purpose was to smash subatomic particles together at near the speed of light. That would require energy levels of 40 trillion electron volts. Using the physics of quantum mechanics, the goal of the project was to shed light on some of the fundamental questions about the formation of the universe. The SSC was designed to be the largest particle accelerator ever constructed, far bigger than its counterpart at Fermi Laboratory. In order to achieve these energy levels, a set of 10,000 magnets was needed. Each of the magnets, cylindrical in shape (1 foot in diameter and 57 feet long), would need to operate at peak levels if the accelerator were to achieve the necessary energy levels for proton collision. The expected price tag just for the construction of the magnets was estimated at $1.5 billion.

The technical difficulties were only part of the overall scope of the project. Construction of the SSC would be an undertaking of unique proportions. Scientists determined that the accelerator required a racetrack-shaped form, buried underground for easier use. The overall circumference of the planned SSC required 54 miles of tunnel to be bored 165 to 200 feet underground. The initial budget estimate for completing the project was $5 billion, and the estimated schedule would require eight years to finish the construction and technical assemblies.

The SSC’s problems began almost immediately after President Reagan’s 1988 kickoff of the project. First, the public (including Congress) had little understanding of the purpose of the project. A goal as nebulous as “particle acceleration” for high-energy physics was not one easily embraced by a majority of citizens. The original operating consortium, URA, consisted of 80 public and private American research centers and universities, but it was expected that European and Asian scientists also would wish to conduct experiments with the SSC. Consequently, the U.S. Department of Energy hoped to offset some of the cost through other countries. While initially receptive to the idea of participating in the project, these countries became vague about their levels of contribution and time frame for payment.

Another huge problem was finding a suitable location for the site of the SSC. At its peak, work on the SSC was expected to employ 4,500 workers. Further, once in full-time operation, the SSC would require a permanent staff of 2,500 employees and an annual operating budget of $270 million. Clearly, it was to almost every state’s interest to lure the SSC. The result was a political nightmare as the National Research Council appointed a site review committee to evaluate proposals from 43 states. After making their judgments based on a series of performance and capability criteria, the committee narrowed their list to eight states. Finally, in late 1988, the contract for the SSC was awarded to Waxahachie, Texas, on a 16,000-acre tract south of Dallas. While Texas was thrilled with the award, the decision meant ruffled feathers for a number of other states and their disappointed congressional representatives.

The final problem with the SSC almost from the beginning was the mounting federal budget deficit, which caused more and more politicians to question the decision to allocate money at a time when Congress was looking for ways to cut more than $30 billion from the budget. This concern ended up being a long-term problem, as the SSC was allocated only $100 million for 1989, less than one third of its initial $348 million funding request. Budget battles would be a constant refrain throughout the SSC’s short life.

Work proceeded slowly on the Waxahachie site throughout the early 1990s. Meanwhile, European financial support for the project was not forthcoming. The various governments privately suspected that the project would never be completed. Their fears were becoming increasingly justified as the cost of the project continued to rise. By 1993, the original $5 billion estimate had ballooned to $11 billion. Meanwhile, less than 20% of the construction had been completed. The process was further slowed when Congress began investigating expenditures and determined that accounting procedures were inadequate. Clearly, control of the project’s budget and schedule had become a serious concern.

In a last desperate move to save SSC funding, Energy Secretary Hazel O’Leary fired URA as prime contractor for the construction project. There was talk of replacing URA with a proven contractor—Martin Marietta and Bechtel were the two leading candidates. By then, however, it was a case of too little, too late. Costs continued to climb and work proceeded at such a snail’s pace that when the 1994 federal budget was put together, funding for the SSC had been removed entirely. The project was dead. The nonrecoverable costs to the U.S. taxpayer from the aborted project have been estimated at anywhere between $1 billion and $2 billion.

Few questioned the government’s capability to construct such a facility. The technology, though leading-edge, had been used previously in other research laboratories. The problem was that the pro- and anti-SSC camps tended to split between proponents of pure research and those who argued (increasingly swaying political support their way) that multibillion-dollar research having no immediate discernible impact on society was a luxury we could not afford, particularly in an era of federal budget cuts and hard choices. The SSC position was further weakened by the activities of the research consortium supervising the project, URA. Its behavior was termed increasingly arrogant by congressional oversight groups that began asking legitimate questions about expenditures and skyrocketing budget requests. In place of evidence of definable progress, the project offered only a sense of out-of-control costs and poor oversight—clearly not the message to send when American taxpayers were questioning their decision to foot a multibillion-dollar bill.17

Question should begin with an paragraph that introduces the topic of your essay and what will be conveyed.  Several paragraphs should follow that incorporate responses to the leading questions as well  as your individual analysis, examples, and conclusions. APA FORMAT FOR THIS!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Suppose you were a consultant called into the project by the federal government in 1990, when it still seemed viable. Given the start to the project, what steps would you have taken to reintroduce some positive “spin” on the Superconducting Supercollider?

What were the warning signs of impending failure as the project progressed? Could these signs have been recognized so that problems could have been foreseen and addressed or, in your opinion, was the project simply impossible to achieve? Take a position and argue its merits.

Search for “superconducting supercollider” on the Internet. How do the majority of stories about the project present it? Given the negative perspective, what are the top three lessons to be learned from this project?

Explanation / Answer

1.Suppose you were a consultant called into the project by the federal government in 1990, when it still seemed viable. Given the start to the project, what steps would you have taken to reintroduce some positive “spin” on the Superconducting Supercollider?

As the case states that there are many technical difficulties in the project, I would jot down the list of all technical difficulties that the project would face and try to solve the problems one by one. I would set up meeting with the physics scientists and see if we can reduce the 54-mile tunnel to a shorter one and use a lesser number of magnets or the other source of energy levels to reduce the budget of the project and still achieve the main goal of the project.As all the members of the congress may not have the ability to understand the scope and use of the project I would try to explain them in normal words and convince them that this project is not just about just spending money on science or being biased on which state gets the project, but it’s about the greater good that will come out and how it will solve the question about the origin of universe and how life evolved from it. I will divert small amounts of funds to do publicity and gain people’s trust and help them understand what this project is about and that the government is not wasting tax payers’ money so that in this way the government will not stop giving funds to the project as it will be a peoples’ project. Also, scientists from different regions like Europe and Asia are interested in this project. I would talk to them and in turn ask them to lobby their own countries to get the financial support for the project to reduce pressure on the United States government. In this way, the money can be flowed into the project with no budget cuts and reintroduce positive spin on the Superconducting Supercollider.

2.What were the warning signs of impending failure as the project progressed? Could these signs have been recognized so that problems could have been foreseen and addressed or, in your opinion, was the project simply impossible to achieve? Take a position and argue its merits.

When Congress allocated only 100 million dollars in 1989 which is less than one third of the yearlyfunding requested,I see this as one of the failures. With Congressmen having no interest on the project, support for the project went down rapidly which caused budget cuts. Hiring URA as a primary contractor with no proven record of handling big projects is also a cause for failure of the project. Also, support from Europe and Asia was stopped as they thought this project is too expensive and would never be completed. I think these are the primary reasons for failure. In my opinion I think the project is possible to achieve. Because there was no proper planning of the project and execution of the project the project was discontinued and wasted billions of tax payers’ money. I would say initial estimates of the project are very wrong because they projected it to be in the 5billions and then in couple of years estimates ballooned to the 11 billions that is almost an 120% increase. If the initial projection costs had 90 % accuracy,then the government would have realized that instead of taking the project entirely on their shoulders, they would have tired public private partnership or multi government support to complete the project. As they realized it after couple of years that the budget is too high they gave up. If the planning and execution of the project was handled in better way and if they already have the contingency plans, then project would’ve definitely succeeded.

3. Search for “superconducting supercollider” on the Internet. How do the majority of stories about the project present it? Given the negative perspective, what are the top three lessons to be learned from this project?

Majority of the stories say that Physicists are one of the major reasons for cancellation of the project as they did a very poor management. Also, it was the time when the Soviet Union was dissolved and America was in no need to prove the supremacy of science to the world. Furthermore, critics of SSC argued that many smaller experiments of the same merit can be funded with this amount. Lessons that can be learned from this project are physicists should not be allowed to do the project management, instead, they need to bring professional big project handlers with enormous experience to handle these kinds of big projects. If the project budget is so big, the government instead of talking all the burden on their shoulders they should implement public-private partnership. Also, if any country tries to take up big projects about science then they should go to United Nations and try to get support from different nations to fund the project and reduce the burden on one single country. I think these are the three major lessons to be learnt from the SSC project.

References

Pinto, J.K. (2016). Project management: Achieving competitive advantage (4thed). Boston:

Pearson

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