- Get a main idea and summary an article below. C. Remote Control To be able to
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- Get a main idea and summary an article below.
C. Remote Control
To be able to demonstrate what is practically feasible using this module we decided to implement the aforemen-tioned exploits directly in the OVMS module.We implemented several keyboard short-cuts on the OVMS client to have an easier control over the dynamics ofthe vehicle. By exploiting the vulnerabilities discovered in the experimentation phase, the module is able to remotely and autonomously drive the vehicle forward and in reverse. Forward and reverse throttle values sent by the client are expressed as percentages of the maximum throttle value acceptable by the Sevcon Gen4. To avoid latency and reliability issues, we implemented the routines directly on the OVMS. The client applications (Android and Web application) are solely used to send basic commands. Android and Web Application: Two client applications have been implemented to demonstrate our scenario: An Android mobile application and a web application. We modified the already existing mobile application provided by OVMS to include the remote control features that we developed. We also modified the OVMS firmware in order to accept the custom commands of the client applications. The Android application interface is shown in Figure 4. The vertical arrows represent the forward and reverse throttle, similar to the ones used by game controllers. The application also allows to disable the throttle pedal, limit the maximum speed or enable a demo mode that repetitively moves the car slowly forward and backward.
VI. Discussions
In this section we will present potential attack sce-narios, suggest solutions and discuss future applications. First, it is important to note that the Sevcon Gen4 is only accessible while the cars is turned on (i.e. ignition turned on). Therefore an attack is only possible while the car is operated. Given that the Twizy does not have door locks nor windows and that the OBD-II port is freely accessible inside the glove box, it is easy for an attacker to install a system such as the OVMS without the owner noticing. The Sevcon Gen4 centralizes many safety critical functions of the vehicle, some of which are not implemented in the case of the Twizy. For example, the master OD indicates the presence of objects managing brake lights and steering servomotors. However the Twizy does not have assisted steering, therefore these features cannot be exploited. If this was the case, as shown in [7], complete control over the steering wheel would be possible and the attacker would be able to make dangerous turns at high speeds and potentially collide with other vehicles or with road infrastructures. Furthermore, we observed that the passcode is the same for every Sevcon Gen4 controller. As a result, once connected to the CAN bus, there are no security measures to prevent an attacker from taking control over the subsystems of the vehicle. The security of
the onboard system only relies on the assumption that an attacker does not have the passcode to access the engine controller. Possible Attack Scenarios: In order to demonstrate the potential of our system, several attack scenarios are described to show some use case examples of the module. We identified the following attack scenarios:
•Forcing the car to go forward or backward.
•Limiting the speed (e.g. Very low speed on the highway).
•Setting unsafe motor and voltage parameters which, could lead to possible damage to the engine of the vehicle.
•Randomly changing motor direction.
•Interacting with the dashboard to display false data, tricking the driver into making dangerous maneuvers.
•Changing or inverting the conversion function of the throttle input.
The proposed attack scenarios can either be activated remotely by an attacker or triggered automatically by the module upon any arbitrary events such as speed or the location information retrieved from the integrated GPS module (e.g. while being in a predefined area or when the speed is over a certain value).
A. Possible Solutions There have been many attempts in solving security issues in automotive environments and more specifically on the CAN bus. One important category of solutions propose use of cryptography for authentication. For instance solutions proposed in [10], [11], [16] are in fact very effective. However, not all the processors used in the ECUs are powerful enough to incorporate them. To solve this issue Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) were proposed. The main idea of HSM is to dedicate part of ECU’s hardware only for encryption purposes[17]. Although HSM handled the security overhead, they demand a new and more sophisticated ECU design, which leads to much higher costs. Cryptographic solutions are the best candidates as a long term solution but this transition will not happen in near future. Therefore it is important to find adequate solutions that are conveniently integrate into the current vehicles. What is worth mentioning about Twizy and Gen4, is the lack of a mechanism that prevents brute-force attacks.
For example, in [7] it has been shown that the Toyota Prius already uses a challenge-response authentication protocol and when an attacker tries to brute-force the system it fails after 10 attempts.
Another category of solutions are based on detecting anomalies in the network, just like the Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) for computer networks. For example in [18]
authors use time and frequency and in [19] the entropy of messages are used as feature to monitor and detect anomalies. To our knowledge only anomaly based solutions can effectively detect and possibly react upon attacks on the CAN bus without requiring any additional change to the network structure. We believe that a temporary solution to achieve a reliable security in vehicles lies in implementing more sophisticated IDS that not only detects anomalies and signature based attacks, but also actively inspect current state of the vehicle and ECUs. For example in the Twizy, an observation of write access to the configuration ODs of Gen4 should flag a suspicious event. If this occurs while thevehicle is moving, the IDS could react upon it and trigger an alarm informing the driver of the incident.
B. Other Applications
Based on what we showed in Section V, one can foresee that these security flaws in the Sevcon Gen4 controller can lead to the development of new applications. Using the
OVMS bundled with our improvements the Twizy can be transformed into an autonomous vehicle at a reasonable cost. More equipments such as additional sensors (e.g. Lidar) and actuators (e.g. for braking and steering) are needed to build a fully functional autonomous vehicle. In this preliminary work we proved that the power train, which is the most critical system in a vehicle, can be con- trolled electronically bringing us one step forward towards automated driving.
VII. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented an experimental platform able to remotely access and interact with internal systems of a vehicle. This platform is composed of a Renault Twizy 80, an Open Vehicle Monitoring System (OVMS) and an Android mobile application used as communication interface. The goal of this work was to remotely control
the safety critical systems of the vehicle. Using the OVMS we accessed and reconfigured the Sevcon Gen4 controller in order to manipulate the behaviour of the vehicle. We showed that with off the shelf hardware it is possible to control vital engine parameters, which allowed us to interact with the operation mode of the vehicle (e.g. slow down or stop the vehicle, reversing the gear while moving). By doing this, we noticed a lack of protection mechanisms, which allowed us to exploit and modify many parameters of the vehicle at runtime (e.g. gear, throttle, speed limita- tion, etc.). For demonstration purposes, we implemented a web interface and an Android mobile application able to interact remotely with the vehicle. We demonstrated the effects of remotely changing the vehicle’s behaviour in a real life situation and pointed out the dangers behind such attacks. Our future work will consist in adding additional equip-ment to the vehicle, including sensors and actuators for the braking and steering. Ultimately, our goal is to produce a low cost fully connected and fully automated electric vehicle.
Explanation / Answer
Remote Control for Automating Vehicle Systems
In this article,"Remote Control for Automating Vehicle systems", the author illustrates how the internal systems of the vehicles can be remotely contolled by using the Open Vehicle Monitoring system (OVMS). This has been implemented in the OVMS module with the use of Android and web application to provide an excellent communication interface.The resuse of the existing mobile application functionalities have been done by using the previous OVMS and exploiting the vulnerabilities with new enhancements.
This paper attempts to present experimental view of the proposed scenario for which Renault Twizy 80 model of OVMS has been taken into consideration.Thus, this study shows how the behaviour of the vehicle can be modified by changing it's paramenters remotely to enhance the safetysystems of the vehicle.
Since,there is always scope for future developments, the article also emphasizes the need for additional security measures required to be implemented to handle any attacks that can occur or surface while interacting with the vehicle systems in real life scenarioas well as what else can be done to invent a more relaible and cost effective automated vehicle system in near future.
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