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(5) Trouble with the terrorist watch-list database ( pg 187) 1. what concepts in

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Question

(5) Trouble with the terrorist watch-list database ( pg 187)
1. what concepts in this chapter are illustrated in this case ?
2. why was the consolidated terror watch list created? what are the benefits of the list ?
3. Describe some of the weaknesses of the watch list. what people, organization, and technology
factors are responsible for the weakness?
4.if you were responsible for the management of the tsc watch list database, what steps would you take
to correct some of these weaknesses ?
5.do you believe that the terrorist watch list represents a significant threat to individuals privacy or
constitutional rights? why or why not ?

Explanation / Answer

Although long a component of U.S. foreign policy, strengthening weak and failing states has increasingly emerged as a high-priority U.S. national security goal since the end of the Cold War. Numerous U.S. government documents point to several threats emanating from states that are variously described as weak, fragile, vulnerable, failing, precarious, failed, in crisis, or collapsed. These threats include providing safe havens for terrorists, organized crime, and other illicit groups; causing conflict, regional instability, and humanitarian emergencies; and undermining efforts to promote democracy, good governance, and economic sustainability. The U.S. government remains in the early stages of developing targeted capabilities and resources for addressing a complex mix of security, development, and governance challenges confronting weak states. U.S. programs and initiatives fall under five main categories: (1) conflict and threat early warning, (2) international cooperation and diplomacy, (3) foreign development assistance, (4) post-conflict stability operations, and (5) interagency coordination. However, as U.S. policies toward weak and failing states have grown in priority and cost, particularly since 9/11, some policy makers and analysts have begun to question the Administration’s commitment to addressing effectively the problems posed by these states. Congress plays a crucial role in the funding and oversight of programs designed to address weak and failing states. Several recent bills in the 110 th Congress and laws directly relate to and have changed aspects of U.S. policy toward these states. Among these include efforts to address (1) civilian post-conflict management authorities and funding (S. 613/H.R. 1084, S. 3288, and H.R. 5658), (2) temporary Department of Defense (DOD) funding transfer authorities to the State Department for security and stabilization assistance (S. 3001/H.R. 5658), (3) temporary DOD security assistance authorities and funding (S. 3001/H.R. 5658), and (4) options for reforming foreign assistance and interagency coordination (as mandated in P.L. 108- 199 and P.L. 109-364). This report first provides definitions of weak states and describes the links between weak states, U.S. national security, and development challenges. Second, the report surveys recent key U.S. programs and initiatives designed to address threats emanating from weak states. Finally, it highlights relevant issues about U.S. policy toward these states that Congress may consider. For further analysis, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities, by Nina Serafino and Martin Weiss; CRS Report RS22855, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006: A Fact Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces, by Nina Serafino; CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: A Fact Sheet, by Nina Serafino; and CRS Report RL34455, Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates, by Catherine Dale, Nina Serafino, and Pat Towell.