Is Thomson’s argument inductive or deductive and, if the former, what is the con

Question

Is Thomson’s argument inductive or deductive and, if the former, what is the connection between the two sets of properties (the properties mentioned in Pr. 1&2 of the Standard Form) or, if the latter, what principle (implied, not stated) is Thomson's analogy pointing toward?

Passage:

I think that ... the fetus is not a person from the moment of conception. A newly

fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a person than an acorn

is an oak tree. But I shall not discuss any of this. For it seems to me to be of great interest

to ask what happens if, for the sake of argument, we allow the premise [we assume

that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception]. How, precisely, are we

supposed to get from there to the conclusion that abortion is morally impermissible?

Opponents of abortion commonly spend most of their time establishing that the fetus

is a person, and hardly any time explaining the step from there to the impermissibility

of abortion.... I suggest that the step they take is neither easy nor obvious, that it calls

for closer examination than it is commonly given, and that when we do give it this closer

examination we shall feel inclined to reject it.

I propose, then, that we grant that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception.

How does the argument go from here? Something like this, I take it. Every person

has a right to life. So the fetus has a right to life. No doubt the mother has a right

to decide what shall happen in and to her body; everyone would grant that. But surely

a person's right to life is stronger and more stringent than the mother's right to decide

what happens in and to her body, and so outweighs it. So the fetus may not be killed; an abortion may not be performed.

It sounds plausible. But now let me ask you to imagine this. You wake up in the morning

and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous, unconscious

violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society

of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you

alone have the right blood to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night

the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be

used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital

now tells you, "Look, we're sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you-we would

never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist now is

plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it's only for nine

months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can be safely unplugged

from you."

Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No doubt it would

be very nice of you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to it? What if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or longer still?

What if the director of the hospital says, "Tough luck, I agree, but you've now got to stay in bed, with the violinist

plugged into you for the rest of your life. Because remember this. All persons have a

right to life, and violinists are persons. Granted you have a right to decide what happens

in and to your body, but a person's right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens

in and to your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged from him." I imagine you

would regard this as outrageous, which suggests that something really is wrong with that plausible-sounding argument I mentioned a moment ago.

Explanation / Answer

In Thomson's argument for abortion, he is :

Therefore, this is an inductive argument.

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