Academic Integrity: tutoring, explanations, and feedback — we don’t complete graded work or submit on a student’s behalf.

It’s a recent invention of the Fed to pay interest to banks on reserve deposits

ID: 2800830 • Letter: I

Question


It’s a recent invention of the Fed to pay interest to banks on reserve deposits held there. The current interest rate is an annual rate of 1.25%, and it applies to both required reserves and excess reserves. There’s something about this innovation that strikes me as being rather odd. The interest innovation was introduced during a time when the Fed was concentrating intensely on a program of Quantitative Easing. One might expect the introduction of interest payments to be part of a tightening policy rather than an easing policy: If banks are suddenly able to earn money by holding excess reserves, we might expect that to discourage lending rather than encourage it, resulting in less easing in credit markets. If banks are now able to earn a return without incurring risks and without administrative expenses, would we not expect that to reduce their motivation to lend money into the private economy? Hence, this (last) question of the week: What argument(s) do you believe might be reasonably made in support of the view that Fed interest payments on bank reserves might not conflict with the goals of a program of monetary easing?
It’s a recent invention of the Fed to pay interest to banks on reserve deposits held there. The current interest rate is an annual rate of 1.25%, and it applies to both required reserves and excess reserves. There’s something about this innovation that strikes me as being rather odd. The interest innovation was introduced during a time when the Fed was concentrating intensely on a program of Quantitative Easing. One might expect the introduction of interest payments to be part of a tightening policy rather than an easing policy: If banks are suddenly able to earn money by holding excess reserves, we might expect that to discourage lending rather than encourage it, resulting in less easing in credit markets. If banks are now able to earn a return without incurring risks and without administrative expenses, would we not expect that to reduce their motivation to lend money into the private economy? Hence, this (last) question of the week: What argument(s) do you believe might be reasonably made in support of the view that Fed interest payments on bank reserves might not conflict with the goals of a program of monetary easing?
It’s a recent invention of the Fed to pay interest to banks on reserve deposits held there. The current interest rate is an annual rate of 1.25%, and it applies to both required reserves and excess reserves. There’s something about this innovation that strikes me as being rather odd. The interest innovation was introduced during a time when the Fed was concentrating intensely on a program of Quantitative Easing. One might expect the introduction of interest payments to be part of a tightening policy rather than an easing policy: If banks are suddenly able to earn money by holding excess reserves, we might expect that to discourage lending rather than encourage it, resulting in less easing in credit markets. If banks are now able to earn a return without incurring risks and without administrative expenses, would we not expect that to reduce their motivation to lend money into the private economy? Hence, this (last) question of the week: What argument(s) do you believe might be reasonably made in support of the view that Fed interest payments on bank reserves might not conflict with the goals of a program of monetary easing?

Explanation / Answer

In quantitative easing , Govt purchase various govt bonds at a cheaper rate so as to let flow the money supply in the economy. But at some times , it may lead to inflation, controlling of which is a primary responsibility of the US Fed. This way it can flow some money into the banking system but for the temporary timebeing it can control the inflation. So I think, Fed interest payments on bank might not conflict with the goals of monetary easing.