Firm B C D Firm A A (50,50) (500-X, 200) B (100, 500 - X) (50, 50) For what valu

Question

Firm B

                                     C                          D

Firm A                   A   (50,50)             (500-X, 200)

                             B    (100, 500 - X)    (50, 50)

For what values of x is strategy D strictly dominant for Firm B?

Select one:

a. All x > 450.

b. All x < 450.

c. x = 450.

d. x < 50.

For what values of x is strategy B strictly dominant for Firm A?

Select one:

a. All x > 450.

b. All x < 450.

c. x = 450.

d. x < 50.

For what values of x is strategy (B, D) the only Nash equilibrium of the game?

Select one:

a. All x > 450.

b. All x < 450.

c. x = 450.

d. x < 50.

Explanation / Answer

a. All x > 450.

for any strategy of A, B will choose strategy D
d. All x > 450

For any value of B, Firm A will choose B

a. All x > 450.
both the strategies are strically dominant so there is only one nash equilibrium

Related Questions

Navigate

• Browse (All)
• Browse F
• Subjects

Integrity-first tutoring: explanations and feedback only — we do not complete graded work. Learn more.