1. Consider the following normal-form game. 1.Does P1 (player 1) has any dominat
ID: 1189944 • Letter: 1
Question
1. Consider the following normal-form game.
1.Does P1 (player 1) has any dominated strategies?
2.Does P2 (player 2) has any dominated strategies?
3.Suppose P2 believes that P1 is rational, should P2 believe P1 will ever play B?
4.Suppose player P2 rules out the possibility that P1 plays B, is there a dominated strategy for player P2?
5.Can you find any more eliminated strategies for P1 or P2? What are the rationalizable strategies for the two players?
6. After iterated deletion of dominated strategies, what is the reduced game (or outcome, if there is only one outcome surviving)? And what are the Nash equilibria (N.E.) of the game?
7.Is there any N.E. in the original game involving players playing the dominated strategies? Why?
Notice dominated strategies and dominant strategies are different ! Please provide the complete answer.
Explanation / Answer
L
R
T
(2,1)
(4,2)
M
(3,4)
(2,3)
There are two nash eq of the above reduced game, (T,R) and (M,L).
7. Yes, (M,L) and (T,R) again because the two additional strategies were rationally redundant and thus adding or deleting them does not change the equilibrium.
L
R
T
(2,1)
(4,2)
M
(3,4)
(2,3)
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