that the fisheries agreement in Problem 5 e E0 fleet? to the 6. Suppose wn, so t
ID: 1161103 • Letter: T
Question
that the fisheries agreement in Problem 5 e E0 fleet? to the 6. Suppose wn, so that the fleets behave noncoopera sume that North America and the EU each nd out either one or two fleets. The more fleets a, the more fish they catch in total but the h of each fleet decreases. The accompanying matrix the profit (in dollars) per week earned by each Assume in the area, shows side EU 1 fleet 2 fleets $10 000 profit $12 000 profit 1 fleet $10 000 profit $4000 profit $4000 profit $7500 profit 2 fleets $12 000 profit $7500 profit a. What is the Nash equilibrium? Will each side choose to send out one or two fleets? b. S uppose that the fish stocks are being depleted fortn considers the future and comes to a tit- Each region One al agreement whereby each side will send only one fleet et out as long as the other does the same.Explanation / Answer
Ans a)
Nash Equilibrium is a combination of strategies of each player for which there is no profitable deviation any player has than the Nash Equilibrium
Nash Equilibrium in above game is (2 fleets, 2 fleets)
Ans 2)
In Tit for tat strategy both players will play in comoperation and if any one of the players deceive then they start playing Nash Equilibrium until other player who deceived play cooperative strategy
in this case if both play Tit for Tat strategy then the profit made by each player will be $10,000.
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