: Final Exam (Cumulative) × O htps:/au.instructure.com/o D xQSearch 80% D Questi

Question

: Final Exam (Cumulative) × O htps:/au.instructure.com/o D xQSearch 80% D Question 3 14 pts Player 2 Left Right Player 1 Bottom 6 4 53 where the number on the left is the payoff to Player 1, and the number on the right is the payoff to Player 2 A) (2 points) Does Player 1 have a dominant strategy. and if so what is it? B) (2 points) Does Player 2 have a dominant strategy and if so what is it? C) (1 point each) For each of the following strategy combinations, write TRUE if it is a Nash Equilibrium, and FALSE if it is not: - ) Top/Left i) Top/Right il) Bottom/Left iv) Bottom Right D) (2 points) What is Player 1's maximin strategy? E) (2 points) What is Player 2's maximin strategy? F) (2 points) if the game were played with Player 1 moving first and Player 2 moving second, using the backward induction method we went over in class, what stratesy will each player choose? Upload choose a File

Explanation / Answer

A. no dominant strategy

player one donot choses 1 option always irrespective of what other player choses

B. no dominant strategy

player 2 donot chose 1 option always what other player choses

C.i) false

ii) true

when player 1 chooses top player 2 chooses right

when player 2 choose right then player 1 chooses top

iii) true

they donot deviate from initial decesion hence its Nash equilibrium

iv) false

v) 9,4

Pure strategy of the row player corresponding to maxmin payoff matrix is called maximum strategy

vi) 9,4

thanx

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