GAME THEORY Of poutines and dive-bars (5 points) Joe from Ottawa and Chantelle f
ID: 1105070 • Letter: G
Question
GAME THEORY
Of poutines and dive-bars (5 points)
Joe from Ottawa and Chantelle from Qu ebec are both in Montr eal and each have to decide where to go for the evening, hoping to meet the other. They have no means of communicating, but Joe knows that Chantelle loves the local dive bar and Chantelle knows that Joe likes to have the best poutine in town. They only have time to go to one establishment. Joe is to the left and Chantelle en haut and their payoffs are on the left / right. Find the two Nash equilibria in pure strategies and the Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies for the following game (state probabilities in fractions, not decimals):
Chantelle
Poutine Dive Bar
Joe Poutine 5 / 3 - 3 / 2
Dive Bar - 5 / - 3 4 / 5
Explanation / Answer
1.Status in Mixed Strategy of equlibrium
Poutine : 0.88=22/25
Dive bar : 0.41=41/100
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